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Friday, 11 June 2010

Act II of the Global Financial Crisis is upon us

In the week following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on Sept. 15, 2008 — global financial markets actually broke down, and by the end of the week, they had to be put on artificial life support. The life support consisted of substituting sovereign credit for the credit of financial institutions, which ceased to be acceptable to counterparties.

As Mervyn King of the Bank of England brilliantly explained, the authorities had to do in the short term the exact opposite of what was needed in the long term: they had to pump in a lot of credit to make up for the credit that disappeared, and thereby reinforce the excess credit and leverage that had caused the crisis in the first place. Only in the longer term, when the crisis had subsided, could they drain the credit and re-establish macroeconomic balance.

This required a delicate two-phase maneuver just as when a car is skidding. First you have to turn the car into the direction of the skid and only when you have regained control can you correct course.

The first phase of the maneuver has been successfully accomplished — a collapse has been averted. In retrospect, the temporary breakdown of the financial system seems like a bad dream. There are people in the financial institutions that survived who would like nothing better than to forget it and carry on with business as usual. This was evident in their massive lobbying effort to protect their interests in the Financial Reform Act that just came out of Congress. But the collapse of the financial system as we know it is real, and the crisis is far from over.

Indeed, we have just entered Act II of the drama, when financial markets started losing confidence in the credibility of sovereign debt. Greece and the euro have taken center stage, but the effects are liable to be felt worldwide. Doubts about sovereign credit are forcing reductions in budget deficits at a time when the banks and the economy may not be strong enough to permit the pursuit of fiscal rectitude. We find ourselves in a situation eerily reminiscent of the 1930s. Keynes has taught us that budget deficits are essential for counter cyclical policies, yet many governments have to reduce them under pressure from financial markets. This is liable to push the global economy into a double dip.

It is important to realize that the crisis in which we find ourselves is not just a market failure but also a regulatory failure, and even more importantly, a failure of the prevailing dogma about financial markets. I have in mind the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Rational Expectation Theory. These economic theories guided, or more exactly misguided, both the regulators and the financial engineers who designed the derivatives and other synthetic financial instruments and quantitative risk management systems which have played such an important part in the collapse. To gain a proper understanding of the current situation and how we got to where we are, we need to go back to basics and re-examine the foundation of economic theory.

I have developed an alternative theory about financial markets which asserts that financial markets do not necessarily tend toward equilibrium; they can just as easily produce asset bubbles. Nor are markets capable of correcting their own excesses. Keeping asset bubbles within bounds have to be an objective of public policy. I propounded this theory in my first book, “The Alchemy of Finance,” in 1987. It was generally dismissed at the time, but the current financial crisis has proven, not necessarily its validity, but certainly its superiority to the prevailing dogma.

Let me briefly recapitulate my theory for those who are not familiar with it. It can be summed up in two propositions. First, financial markets, far from accurately reflecting all the available knowledge, always provide a distorted view of reality. This is the principle of fallibility. The degree of distortion may vary from time to time. Sometimes it’s quite insignificant, at other times it is quite pronounced. When there is a significant divergence between market prices and the underlying reality I speak of far from equilibrium conditions. That is where we are now.

Second, financial markets do not play a purely passive role; they can also affect the so-called fundamentals they are supposed to reflect. These two functions that financial markets perform work in opposite directions. In the passive or cognitive function, the fundamentals are supposed to determine market prices. In the active or manipulative function market, prices find ways of influencing the fundamentals. When both functions operate at the same time, they interfere with each other. The supposedly independent variable of one function is the dependent variable of the other, so that neither function has a truly independent variable. As a result, neither market prices nor the underlying reality is fully determined. Both suffer from an element of uncertainty that cannot be quantified. I call the interaction between the two functions reflexivity. Frank Knight recognized and explicated this element of unquantifiable uncertainty in a book published in 1921, but the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Rational Expectation Theory have deliberately ignored it. That is what made them so misleading.

Reflexivity sets up a feedback loop between market valuations and the so-called fundamentals which are being valued. The feedback can be either positive or negative. Negative feedback brings market prices and the underlying reality closer together. In other words, negative feedback is self-correcting. It can go on forever, and if the underlying reality remains unchanged, it may eventually lead to an equilibrium in which market prices accurately reflect the fundamentals. By contrast, a positive feedback is self-reinforcing. It cannot go on forever because eventually, market prices would become so far removed from reality that market participants would have to recognize them as unrealistic. When that tipping point is reached, the process becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction. That is how financial markets produce boom-bust phenomena or bubbles. Bubbles are not the only manifestations of reflexivity, but they are the most spectacular.

In my interpretation equilibrium, which is the central case in economic theory, turns out to be a limiting case where negative feedback is carried to its ultimate limit. Positive feedback has been largely assumed away by the prevailing dogma, and it deserves a lot more attention.

I have developed a rudimentary theory of bubbles along these lines. Every bubble has two components: an underlying trend that prevails in reality and a misconception relating to that trend. When a positive feedback develops between the trend and the misconception, a boom-bust process is set in motion. The process is liable to be tested by negative feedback along the way, and if it is strong enough to survive these tests, both the trend and the misconception will be reinforced. Eventually, market expectations become so far removed from reality that people are forced to recognize that a misconception is involved. A twilight period ensues during which doubts grow and more and more people lose faith, but the prevailing trend is sustained by inertia. As Chuck Prince, former head of Citigroup, said, “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We are still dancing.” Eventually a tipping point is reached when the trend is reversed; it then becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction.

Typically bubbles have an asymmetric shape. The boom is long and slow to start. It accelerates gradually until it flattens out again during the twilight period. The bust is short and steep because it involves the forced liquidation of unsound positions. Disillusionment turns into panic, reaching its climax in a financial crisis.

The simplest case of a purely financial bubble can be found in real estate. The trend that precipitates it is the availability of credit; the misconception that continues to recur in various forms is that the value of the collateral is independent of the availability of credit. As a matter of fact, the relationship is reflexive. When credit becomes cheaper, activity picks up and real estate values rise. There are fewer defaults, credit performance improves, and lending standards are relaxed. So at the height of the boom, the amount of credit outstanding is at its peak, and a reversal precipitates false liquidation, depressing real estate values.

The bubble that led to the current financial crisis is much more complicated. The collapse of the subprime bubble in 2007 set off a chain reaction, much as an ordinary bomb sets off a nuclear explosion. I call it a superbubble. It has developed over a longer period of time, and it is composed of a number of simpler bubbles. What makes the superbubble so interesting is the role that the smaller bubbles have played in its development.

The prevailing trend in the superbubble was the ever-increasing use of credit and leverage. The prevailing misconception was the belief that financial markets are self-correcting and should be left to their own devices. President Reagan called it the “magic of the marketplace,” and I call it market fundamentalism. It became the dominant creed in the 1980s. Since market fundamentalism was based on false premises, its adoption led to a series of financial crises. Each time, the authorities intervened, merged away, or otherwise took care of the failing financial institutions, and applied monetary and fiscal stimuli to protect the economy. These measures reinforced the prevailing trend of ever-increasing credit and leverage, and as long as they worked, they also reinforced the prevailing misconception that markets can be safely left to their own devices. The intervention of the authorities is generally recognized as creating amoral hazard; more accurately it served as a successful test of a false belief, thereby inflating the superbubble even further.

It should be emphasized that my theories of bubbles cannot predict whether a test will be successful or not. This holds for ordinary bubbles as well as the superbubble. For instance, I thought the emerging market crisis of 1997-98 would constitute the tipping point for the superbubble, but I was wrong. The authorities managed to save the system and the superbubble continued growing. That made the bust that eventually came in 2007-8 all the more devastating.

What are the implications of my theory for the regulation of the financial system?

First and foremost, since markets are bubble-prone, the financial authorities have to accept responsibility for preventing bubbles from growing too big. Alan Greenspan and other regulators have expressly refused to accept that responsibility. If markets can’t recognize bubbles, Greenspan argued, neither can regulators — and he was right. Nevertheless, the financial authorities have to accept the assignment, knowing full well that they will not be able to meet it without making mistakes. They will, however, have the benefit of receiving feedback from the markets, which will tell them whether they have done too much or too little. They can then correct their mistakes.

Second, in order to control asset bubbles it is not enough to control the money supply; you must also control the availability of credit. This cannot be done by using only monetary tools; you must also use credit controls. The best-known tools are margin requirements and minimum capital requirements. Currently, they are fixed irrespective of the market’s mood, because markets are not supposed to have moods. Yet they do, and the financial authorities need to vary margin and minimum capital requirements in order to control asset bubbles.

Regulators may also have to invent new tools or revive others that have fallen into disuse. For instance, in my early days in finance, many years ago, central banks used to instruct commercial banks to limit their lending to a particular sector of the economy, such as real estate or consumer loans, because they felt that the sector was overheating. Market fundamentalists consider that kind of intervention unacceptable, but they are wrong. When our central banks used to do it, we had no financial crises to speak of. The Chinese authorities do it today, and they have much better control over their banking system. The deposits that Chinese commercial banks have to maintain at the People’s Bank of China were increased 17 times during the boom, and when the authorities reversed course, the banks obeyed them with alacrity.

Third, since markets are potentially unstable, there are systemic risks in addition to the risks affecting individual market participants. Participants may ignore these systemic risks in the belief that they can always dispose of their positions, but regulators cannot ignore them because if too many participants are on the same side, positions cannot be liquidated without causing a discontinuity or a collapse. They have to monitor the positions of participants in order to detect potential imbalances. That means that the positions of all major market participants, including hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, need to be monitored. The drafters of the Basel Accords made a mistake when they gave securities held by banks substantially lower risk ratings than regular loans: they ignored the systemic risks attached to concentrated positions in securities. This was an important factor aggravating the crisis. It has to be corrected by raising the risk ratings of securities held by banks. That will probably discourage loans, which is not such a bad thing.

Fourth, derivatives and synthetic financial instruments perform many useful functions, but they also carry hidden dangers. For instance, the securitization of mortgages was supposed to reduce risk through geographical diversification. In fact, it introduced a new risk by separating the interest of the agents from the interest of the owners. Regulators need to fully understand how these instruments work before they allow them to be used, and they ought to impose restrictions guard against those hidden dangers. For instance, agents packaging mortgages into securities ought to be obliged to retain sufficient ownership to guard against the agency problem.

Credit-default swaps (C.D.S.) are particularly dangerous. They allow people to buy insurance on the survival of a company or a country while handing them a license to kill. C.D.S. ought to be available to buyers only to the extent that they have a legitimate insurable interest. Generally speaking, derivatives ought to be registered with a regulatory agency just as regular securities have to be registered with the S.E.C. or its equivalent. Derivatives traded on exchanges would be registered as a class; those traded over-the-counter would have to be registered individually. This would provide a powerful inducement to use exchange traded derivatives whenever possible.

Finally, we must recognize that financial markets evolve in a one-directional, nonreversible manner. The financial authorities, in carrying out their duty of preventing the system from collapsing, have extended an implicit guarantee to all institutions that are “too big to fail.” Now they cannot credibly withdraw that guarantee. Therefore, they must impose regulations that will ensure that the guarantee will not be invoked. Too-big-to-fail banks must use less leverage and accept various restrictions on how they invest the depositors’ money. Deposits should not be used to finance proprietary trading. But regulators have to go even further. They must regulate the compensation packages of proprietary traders to ensure that risks and rewards are properly aligned. This may push proprietary traders out of banks, into hedge funds where they properly belong. Just as oil tankers are compartmentalized in order to keep them stable, there ought to be firewalls between different markets. It is probably impractical to separate investment banking from commercial banking as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 did. But there have to be internal compartments keeping proprietary trading in various markets separate from each other. Some banks that have come to occupy quasi-monopolistic positions may have to be broken up.

While I have a high degree of conviction on these five points, there are many questions to which my theory does not provide an unequivocal answer. For instance, is a high degree of liquidity always desirable? To what extent should securities be marked to market? Many answers that followed automatically from the Efficient Market Hypothesis need to be re-examined.

It is clear that the reforms currently under consideration do not fully satisfy the five points I have made, but I want to emphasize that these five points apply only in the long run. As Mervyn King explained, the authorities had to do in the short run the exact opposite of what was required in the long run. And as I said earlier, the financial crisis is far from over. We have just ended Act II. The euro has taken center stage, and Germany has become the lead actor. The European authorities face a daunting task: they must help the countries that have fallen far behind the Maastricht criteria to regain their equilibrium while they must also correct the deficiencies of the Maastricht Treaty which have allowed the imbalances to develop. The euro is in what I call a far-from-equilibrium situation. But I prefer to discuss this subject in Germany, which is the lead actor, and I plan to do so at the Humboldt University in Berlin on June 23. I hope you will forgive me if I avoid the subject until then.

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Tuesday, 8 June 2010

Mining Super Profits Tax - Let's mine bright ideas and stop being shrinking violets

Mining tax: it's so good, they're against it

Ross Gittins says mining companies are opposed to the super-profits tax because they're afraid other countries will adopt it.

When it comes to matters economic, the cultural cringe is alive and well. Australians lack confidence in ourselves and our own inventiveness. We see our country's rightful place as a follower of international trends, never a leader of them. We seek the approval of foreigners and fear their disapprobation.

One of the favourite Australian laments is the story about some wonderful new invention that local bankers or businessmen lacked either the wit or the courage to take up, thus forcing the inventor to take his idea abroad for development and losing for Australia all the profits that could have flowed.

We've heard such stories so many times most of us hold this view of Australia as an article of faith. A related belief - so deeply held it's impervious to contrary evidence - is that we suffer a terrible Brain Drain as our brightest young scientists and professionals move abroad in search of the opportunities we deny them.

These narratives may seem to contradict my case: we know full well how valuable our inventions and young people are, how happy the rest of the world is to take them off our hands. At another level, however, they reveal our cringe: trust us Aussies to keep stuffing up.

They also reveal our protectionist predilections: good things should be kept at home, which is the only way they can benefit us. To let them leave is to lose.

There was a time when Australia was happy to do things its own way for its own reasons. What the rest of the world thought we neither knew nor cared. But some of the things we pioneered were copied by others and when we learnt of it we were proud.

Australia (and our Tasman cousins) led the world in electoral reform. In 1856 we began introducing the secret ballot. When the rest of the world began copying us, it became known as the ''Australian ballot''.
The Kiwis pioneered votes for women in 1893, South Australia followed in 1894. Again, the rest of the world followed.
Our use of compulsory voting hasn't caught on elsewhere, but why should we care? We don't. But as the Brits consider abandoning their first-past-the-post voting system, some are saying they should switch to ''the Australian system'' of preferential voting.

But all those intellectual inventions were a long time ago. It's more recently that we seem to have acquired our self-doubt, our suspicion that if we're leading the world on something we're sticking our neck out and have probably got it wrong. Our desire to be a trend follower, never a trend setter.

You see that in a common attitude to the plan for an emissions trading scheme. Why should we be the first? (We wouldn't have been, but let it pass.) What about the big boys? What are they doing? Wouldn't it be safer to wait until everyone else has moved?

Admittedly, this is not a case where what the rest of the world does doesn't matter. Only concerted international action will succeed in lowering global emissions. Even so, a self-confident nation would have seen the advantages of being among the first to take the plunge. The sooner we make a start, the lower the ultimate cost of making the transition to a low-carbon world.

And since Australia has a lot to lose from climate change, why don't we try to break the stand-off, set the others a good example and press them to join us? Aren't the stakes high enough to justify taking a bit of a risk?

All these were Kevin Rudd's arguments until his failure of leadership. Now he has succumbed to the national timidity and joined the Poor Little Australia party, waiting for the world to determine our fate.
In their fight to avoid paying more tax, the big mining companies are seeking to play on our self-doubts. No other country has such a resource tax, they claim, and nowhere else are they required to pay so much. If Australia persists with this weird tax they'll cancel their projects and take their money elsewhere.
Oh dear, don't desert us. Please!

Know what their problem is? Australia, being one of the world's leading mining nations, is a world leader in designing taxes that increase the public's take without discouraging mining activity or otherwise damaging the economy.

The resource super-profits tax is a state-of-the-art tax, designed by our leading economists not to do all the bad things it's being accused of. It's a close relative of an earlier Australian invention, the resource rent tax, developed by Professor Ross Garnaut and others at the Australian National University.

The big international mining companies are fighting it partly because they fear that, once its success has been demonstrated, it will be copied by other countries. And they're fighting it by trying to press our cringe button: if no one else is doing it, it must be a dumb thing to do.

The miners are right to fear the tax will be adopted by other countries because that's just what's happened to that other great invention of Australian economists, the ''income-contingent loan'' (known to you as HECS, the higher education contribution scheme). This one was invented by Professor Bruce Chapman, also of the ANU.

We cringers think of Australia as a small country that carries no weight in the world. But the world's big companies see us as a potential setter of dangerous precedents. Whenever we decide to do something novel that could impinge on their profits, they quietly assist their local colleagues in trying to dissuade us.
The world's tobacco companies are still trying to prevent us preceding with our path-breaking move to plain cigarette packaging. When the Reserve Bank moved to end the banks' ban on shopkeepers charging a fee to people paying by credit card, the two international card companies were most agitated.

Turns out the world has more faith in Australian innovations than we do.

Ross Gittins is economics editor.

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Things Bogans Like - #146 – Our Sam Stosur

Ever since Lleyton Hewitt appeared on Home and Away, and then the Logies (with identically-dressed soapie-wife and child in tow), the bogan’s love affair with him has dwindled. When he was smashing foreigners at Wimbledon and Flushing Meadows, the bogan was more than willing to overlook the fact that he was, by all outward appearances, a petulant tool. When he would bring vicarious glory onto the bogan by winning five-set epics on Spanish clay to prevent us being relegated from the world group in Davis Cup, the bogan, unaware that it wasn’t the Davis Cup Final, would sit back and bask in the sheer awesomeness of being Australian when there were people like Lleyton to win stuff on the bogan’s behalf.

But then, Lleyton realised that it was more fun to have a really hot wife and spend time with his kid than run around all day chasing a fluffy yellow ball. As his winning percentage fell, his relentless acts of wank lost their faux-rebellious lustre, and the bogan decided that it only liked Lleyton when he was being good at things on the bogan’s behalf. Never mind the fact that he’s still among the best 100 tennis players on Earth. The only way Lleyton would earn the bogan’s normally easily-won forgiveness would be an Australian Open win.

Hence, the bogan looked further afield for a tennis player through who to live vicariously. The pickings were slim. While the occasional Peter Luczak would grind out a gutsy win, he wasn’t good enough for the bogan to latch onto regularly. Alicia Molik, who the bogan found attractive in an odd, fear-induced way, retired at about the same time, and Bernard Tomic, while exhibiting all of Lleyton’s arsefaced traits, remained a minor, and wasn’t beating the big boys.

Someone once mentioned Sam Stosur. The bogan looked at her, saw that she had massive guns, and decided that she was not feminine enough to like. Male bogans were scared of her in a decidedly non-Molikesque fashion, and female bogans were intimidated by the fact that she was prettier AND stronger than them. They proceeded to ignore her.

She then entered the world’s top twenty players. The bogan paid no heed. She then entered the world’s top ten. The bogan was unaware. The bogan trashmedia reported nary a word. She went to Roland Garros, beat Justine Henin. Nothing. She beat Serena Williams in an epic three-setter. Some fringe-bogues’ ears perked up. Suddenly, she was in the French Open Final, the first Australian woman in decades to do so. She was now worthy of bogan love. She was bestowed the ultimate in bogan honorifics. She became ‘Ours’. She is no longer merely ‘Stosur’, or even ‘Samantha’, but simply ‘Sam’.

Notwithstanding the fact that if an athlete in their mid-20s suddenly became good enough to make a grand slam final, had enormous muscles, yet came from China, the bogan would automatically assume that the athlete in question was doping. But Sam’s an Aussie, so it’s down to the hard work and persistence that the bogan automatically attributes to itself that Our Sam got to the top.

Samantha Stosur is now the unambiguous property of Australia’s millions of bogans. She’s ‘ours’.

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Drilling Disasters Can't Happen Here - In run-up to BP spill, media touted offshore safety

As the United States examines the origins of the environmental catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico, one factor that should not be overlooked is media coverage that served to cover up dangers rather than expose them. When President Barack Obama declared a new push for offshore drilling (3/31/10), asserting that "oil rigs today generally don't cause spills" (4/2/10), corporate news outlets echoed such pollyanna sentiments:

You know, there are a lot of serious people looking at, "Are there ways that we can do drilling and we can do nuclear that are--that are nowhere near as risky as what they were 10 or 15 or 20 years ago?" Offshore drilling today is a lot more safer, in many ways, environmentally, today than it was 20 years ago.
--David Gergen, CNN's Situation Room (3/31/10)

Some Americans have an opinion of offshore drilling that was first formed decades ago with those pictures of oil on the beaches in Santa Barbara, California. Others see it differently. They say time and technology have changed things. They say in order to lessen our dependence on foreign oil and keep gas prices low, we've got to bring more of it out of the ground and from under the sea.
--Brian Williams, NBC Nightly News (3/31/10)

The technology of oil drilling has made huge advances.... The time has come for my fellow environmentalists to reassess their stand on offshore oil. It is not clear that the risks of offshore oil drilling still outweigh the benefits. The risk of oil spills in the United States is quite low.
--Eric Smith, Washington Post op-ed (4/2/10)

Some of the most ironic objections come from those who say offshore exploration will destroy beaches and coastlines, citing the devastating 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska as an example. The last serious spill from a drilling accident in U.S. waters was in 1969, off Santa Barbara, California.
--USA Today editorial (4/2/10)

Since the big spill off the coast of California about three decades ago, the big oil companies have really put a lot of time, money and resources into making sure that their drilling is a lot more safe and environmentally sound.
--Monica Crowley, Fox Business Happy Hour (3/31/10)

Drilling could be conducted in an environmentally sensitive manner. We already drill in an environmentally sensitive manner.
--Sean Hannity, Fox News' Hannity (4/1/10)

And even in terms of the environment, we're going to consume oil one way or the other. It's safer for the planet if it's done under our strict controls and high technology in America as opposed to Nigeria.... We've got a ton of drilling happening every day today in the Gulf of Mexico in a hurricane area and it's successful.
--Charles Krauthammer, WJLA's Inside Washington (4/4/10)

We had a hurricane on the Gulf Coast and there was no oil spill. If Katrina didn't cause an oil spill with all those oil wells in the Gulf....
--Dick Morris, Fox News' O'Reilly Factor (3/31/10)

The two main reasons oil and other fossil fuels became environmentally incorrect in the 1970s--air pollution and risk of oil spills--are largely obsolete. Improvements in drilling technology have greatly reduced the risk of the kind of offshore spill that occurred off Santa Barbara in 1969.... To fear oil spills from offshore rigs today is analogous to fearing air travel now because of prop plane crashes.
--Steven F. Hayward, Weekly Standard (4/26/10)


And these messages didn't entirely disappear after the Gulf of Mexico disaster unfolded. In its May 10 issue, Time magazine had a small box headlined, "Offshore-Drilling Disasters: Rare But Deadly," which listed a mere four incidents--the most recent in 1988. But it doesn't take too much research to turn up a slew of other incidents that raise concerns: the Unocal-owned Seacrest drillship that capsized in 1989, killing 91 people; Phillips Petroleum's Alexander Kielland rig that collapsed in 1980, killing 123, and more. The list managed to overlook at least three well disasters in the Gulf of Mexico that resulted in oil spills--two incidents off the Louisiana coast in 1999, and the Usumacinta spill in Mexican waters in 2007.

A previous Time.com story (4/24/10) had noted that the Minerals Management Service, which oversees offshore drilling, reported 39 fires or explosions in the first five months of 2009 alone; though the magazine said the "good news" is that "most of these" did not result in death. The website Oil Rig Disasters tallies 184 incidents, dozens of which involved fatalities--and 73 of which occurred after 1988.

Clearly there are different ways to measure such things, but it's hard not to feel that Time's point was to suggest that drilling disasters are really too rare to worry about.

Since the BP/Deepwater disaster, many news outlets have run investigative pieces detailing the long history of negligent oversight of the offshore drilling industry. But when the New York Times tells readers (5/25/10) about the "enduring laxity of federal regulation of offshore operations," one can't help but wonder why this apparently well-known problem got so little attention before the environmental catastrophe.


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The unkindness of in-kind aid


"Congratulations Charlie, your poverty-stricken family has just won a lifetime's supply of non-transferable chocolate!" "$%@#!"

The biggest story in the development blogosphere last month has been the 1 million t-shirts for Africa campaign and the incredibly strong  reaction of the blogging community. For those new to the discussion, a full list of all the relevant posts is available here. Until now, my brain was too overloaded to manage anything but a few grunts in crayon form.

There have been various, familiar arguments against the prospect of dumping more used t-shirts into markets in poor countries. A lot of people are worried about the effect on those markets themselves, of undercutting local textile producers. I’ve made this argument myself before, but am becoming less convinced by it; I’m beginning to suspect that the damage to local producers has already been firmly done, and that other sources of cheap clothes (such as growing imports from places like China) will continue to dominated markets in the long-run.  Unfortunately there hasn’t been much in terms of rigorous study on the topic, aside from an in-depth report from Oxfam, making it difficult to know what the aggregate effects are.

Let’s move on to the more important argument, which has to do with missed opportunities and meeting the needs of the recipient. This has been covered quite a bit, but I think it’s an important enough argument to be restated in a more precise way, so here we go:

Gifts in-kind are, for most recipients, strictly inferior than cash gifts of an equivalent value.
Imagine a poor person with no income. Now, give her a dollar and she will spend it on the most urgent necessity  (in econospeak, the good that offers her the highest expected gain in utility). Give her a second dollar, and she may continue to spend it on that good, or she may switch to another good. As the her income rises, she will dedicate each marginal dollar to what matters most to her at that moment. If you give her another dollar and she buys a mango, that doesn’t necessarily mean she couldn’t afford the mango before, but that a mango  currently offers her the greatest marginal benefit after spending her other resources on other, possibly more important things.

This is an extremely rational model of expenditure prioritization. Of course, reality is much more complex – some would argue that it’s not very easy for people to identify what they need or may ignore their own best-interests (although I don’t think the latter assumption gets us very far in life). If you can stomach the constraints of my simple model for a moment, consider the following thought experiment:

You have a population of people of different incomes and different priorities. Some of them have shirts, others don’t. You can easily identify these people and you decide to buy/obtain shirts for those lacking them (at a cost to you of $1).

What is the welfare impact of your intervention compared with just handing out dollars? For a select few – those that were poised to spend their next available dollar on a t-shirt, the welfare impact is equivalent. For everyone else that is shirtless, the welfare impact of giving a shirt is strictly less than that handing out a dollar.
Why is this the case? If you hand someone a dollar, they spend it on the good that represents the highest possible welfare benefit. So if they spend it on something other than a t-shirt, it means that the t-shirt wasn’t the best possible purchase for them*. So, if you hand them a t-shirt instead of a dollar, there is an implicit cost to that missed opportunity. The harder it is for the recipient to exchange that t-shirt for what they want, the bigger the missed opportunity.

The resulting rule of thumb is: “if someone doesn’t have a shirt, there are probably a lot of other things that they don’t have, and we have no good reason to give the shirt priority.” The important thing to take away is that the same holds for all in-kind gifts.

Of course, there are lots of other reasons why we may not want to just go around giving cash, but there are lots of alternatives to running around dispensing used goods. On a micro-scale the gold standard of cash-transfers may be impossible to beat with in-kind gifts, but interventions that move beyond the individual, such as investment in public goods or removing kinks in the system that create poverty traps, can result in larger welfare gains.
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*I am, in this simple model, mostly ignoring budget dynamics. If your income was 90 cents a day, you will buy whatever bundle of goods that is best suited for you at the prevailing prices. It could be that you really, really want a shirt, more than anything in the world, but they cost $1, and when your income goes up to $1 a day, you only spend your money on shirts, and would have loved it if someone had given you a shirt when you were still making 90 cents a day. However, these people are no easier to identify, and so giving each person an extra dollar in income is still strictly superior to handing out $1 t-shirts, because those that had always wanted a t-shirt will just go on to buy the t-shirt.

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